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Abstract
Emotional mood has an effect on ability to recall 
information and type of information recalled. It may 
function either as state-dependent effect or as selective 
attention to material later recalled. The latter phenomenon 
is tested in this study, in comparison to cognitive sugges­
tion's effect on attention. Results are discussed in terms 
of further procedural modifications.
1Introduction
Schacter and Singer (1962) made it widely known that 
emotion and cognition could not correctly be considered inde­
pendent phenomenon. Their work demonstrating that the 
emotion experienced may depend on the cognitive label 
applied to it suggested that some degree of interrelation 
was present. More often than not, though, research has been 
directed toward cognitive roles in emotional processes.
Little emphasis has been placed on emotion's place in cog­
nitive function.
Investigation of affect and memory relationships has 
demonstrated increased retention of material associated with 
distinct emotional states. When individuals feel a certain 
way they are exposed to information, its recall is more 
accurate than when there is no emotional involvement.
The study of attention also yields examples of affect 
influencing the salience of available information and judg­
ments made about it. Experimental subjects whose emotional 
states differ often attend to and evaluate the same infor­
mation differently.
State-Dependent Retention
Researchers familiar with drug-state dependent re­
tention sought to extend the theory that a drug state
2serves as a context for memory retrieval, to states of 
emotional mood. In drug-SCR (state dependent retention), 
a subject learns something under the influence of a drug, 
and then attempts to recall it either in the same state, or 
while sober. Generally, retention is better for individuals 
who recall under the influence of the drug than not.
In their 1973 article, Henry, Weingartner, and Murphy 
administered a memory task to persons in fluctuating emo­
tional states. The subjects were directed to free-associate 
up to twenty words in response to two words selected by 
the experimenter. They were then asked to repeat their 
own free-associated responses four days later. The subjects 
used were judged to be clinically manic-depressive, and were 
given a number of trials over a period of weeks. At each 
trial, the extent of their change in mood from the previous 
session.
Henry and his colleagues found that the greater the 
change in mood over the four-day interval - whether from 
manic to depressive or depressive to manic - the less 
subjects could remember of the responses they had given 
to the two stimulus words.
The opposite is also true, and it suggests that moods 
can function as a SDR context: the less the mood change,
the less material forgotten. Memories are easier to 
retrieve if the individual feels like he did when they were
first encoded.
3Macht, Spear, and Levis (1977) placed subjects in the 
bnme affective state for both learning and recall phases of 
their experiment and demonstrated a mood-state dependent 
effect. The subjects learned a list of nouns in the pres­
ence or absence of an electric shock, which was supposed to 
elicit anxiety. They were then asked to recall the list 
with or without the shock.
The authors found that individuals who received the 
same treatment during both learning and recall phases 
recalled a significantly higher number of words. This, they 
claim, is SDR. A methodological point that might be raised 
here is that the two mood states they wished to induce, 
anxiety and its absence, may not have been truly distinct.
It is not evident that an effort was made to discover just 
what the unshocked subjects felt - only that the shocked 
ones were feeling anxious. No emphasis is placed on the 
feelings of control subjects.
Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan (1978) use a more bal­
anced mood manipulation. They took a group of "highly 
hypnotizable" college students and suggested to them in­
tense feelings of joy or sadness. While a discussion of 
the mechanisms of hypnosis is beyond this paper's scope, it 
is apparent that emotional changes induced hypnotically 
result in many of the same subjective and objective indi­
cations of "normal" deep emotion: changes in voice
4inflection, weeping, and facial patterns. With regard to 
Macht, et ai. (1977), it would seem that hypnosis produces 
more easily recognizable emotions than does shock.
Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan (1978), having placed 
their subjects in a trance, requested that they recollect 
an intensely happy or sad experience with strong mental 
images attached. They then told the subjects to retain 
the strong feelings but forget the evocative imagery.
In the first portion of the experiment, the authors 
put the subjects into a happy or sad mood and directed them 
to learn a mixed list of abstract, emotionally weighted nouns. 
Then the opposite mood was induced, and they were asked to 
recall the list. Following this, the original mood was 
restored and subjects were again asked to recall the list.
No SDR was evident. "Sad" subjects recalled the 
same amount of material in both states; neither group re­
called a significant number of words consistent with their 
mood during learning.
In the second part of the experiment, an attempt was 
made to eliminate order effects by testing half of the sub­
jects first in the learning mood and then in the opposite 
one, and half in the opposite mood first. Subjects were 
also tested a day after learning to provide some time for 
forgetting material (there had been virtually no loss of 
material in the first trial).
Again, there were no results of significance: 
neither amount of material retrieved from memory nor emo­
tional content of words interacted with the mood experi­
enced during learning.
In the final part of the experiment, the authors 
took a slightly different tack. Ratner than one list 
made up of positive and negative words, they used two.
They hoped to show a reduction in the retroactive inter­
ference that is present when two word lists are learned. 
This portion of the experiment was an attempt to use SDR 
to distinguish one set of material from another.
The plan was to have the subjects learn list A while 
in mood-state A, list B while in mood-state B, and subse­
quently recall both lists either in state A or B. Under 
normal circumstances, having learned List A before List B 
would result in List B's interfering with the recall of 
List A. If the authors' hypothesis is true, that moods 
serve to make distinct similar sets of information, then 
there should be minimal interference in recalling list A 
when the List A recall state is the same as the List A 
learning state but different from the List B learning state 
(Mood A). Conversely, interference should be maximized 
in recalling List A when the state for recall is different 
from the learning state for List A but the same as the 
learning state for List B (Mood B).
6Here Hower, et al. obtained the desired results: 
subjects were able to recall lists better in a mood-state 
similar to the one experienced during learning. Also, the 
prediction that mood state could both maximize and mini­
mize retroactive interference was strongly supported.
Questioning the applicability of mood-state dependent 
retrieval to non-laboratc^y settings, Bower (1981) used the 
daily experiences of his subjects as a target of recall.
He asked them to keep a diary of all the "emotional inci­
dents” they experienced in a week, and collected the diaries 
at the end of that time.
Placing the subjects in a hypnotically inducted plea­
sant or unpleasant mood, Bower asked them to recall all of 
the recorded events that they could. The results were as 
anticipated: individuals in a positive mood recalled a
greater proportion of positive incidents; those in a nega­
tive mood recalled more negative incidents.
This finding is a confirmation of Bower, Monteiro, 
and Gilligan's earlier finding, that information learned, or 
encoded, in one affective state is more accessible when 
that state is re-induced. Gilligan and Bower (see Note 1) 
eliminated the rating element in their next experiment.
In that, they focused on recalling emotional events from 
childhood. Their subjects were hypnotized, and strong 
positive or negative feelings were induced. The experimenters
asked their, to mention unrelated emotional incidents of any 
kind that occurred before they were fifteen years old.
They were directed to describe each one in only a few 
sentences, and then to go on to describe another. The 
experimenters were careful not to demand particular types 
of incident or suggest a desired emotional content. After 
collecting these descriptions, the experimenters sent the 
subjects home with instructions to return the next day.
Then, the experimenters told them to classify the 
remembered incidents as either pleasant, unpleasant, or 
neutral. A control group had also been given the same 
recall instructions, and the same classification instruc­
tions, but was not hypnotized during recall. None of the 
subjects were in an induced mood condition during classifi­
cation, so that the labelling of the recollections was not 
influenced by the recall mood.
They found that happy subjects retrieved significantly 
more pleasant memories than unpleasant ones, while unhappy 
subjects demonstrated a nonsignificant bias toward retriev­
ing negative ones. The authors account for the poor effect 
with negative mood by observing that all subjects, even those 
in the control group, show a bias toward recalling positive 
events.
SDR, then, is one way mood works to organize and 
improve retention. Several kinds of material to be memor­
ized are recalled more completely if the mood felt at the
material's initial exposure is re-induced. An explanation 
for this phenomenon is a type of semantic network (to use 
common cognitive parlance), offered in Bower, 1981.
As he suggests it, events are clusters of descrip­
tive propositions in memory, and are recorded there by 
creating new "associative connections" between specific con­
cepts that describe the events. The descriptive proposi­
tions are the fundamental unit of thought, and the process 
of thought is the activation of a proposition and its 
related concepts. Bower describes the elements of con­
sciousness as "the sensations, concepts, and propositions 
whose current activation level exceeds some threshold. 
Activation presumably speaks from one concept to another, 
or from one proposition to another by the associative link­
ages between them." (Bov/er, 1981, p. 134).
By this model Bower presents an explanation of the 
SDR effect. Using the word list experiment as an example, 
many propositions could become associated with the experi­
ment for the subject. One might be having to read the 
word list, with such concepts as number of words, meanings 
of words, and spellings attached. Another proposition might 
be the emotion experienced during the experiment, with 
attached concepts like verbal labels for the emotion, 
physiological sensations, and evocative situations.
9Presumably, the word list to be retrieved would be 
raised above threshold into consciousness when enough 
related concepts and propositions are activated - like a 
return to the laboratory, reinduction of the emotional 
state, or verbal instructions to recall from experimenters.
Attention
State-dependency, however, may not be the sole process 
by which emotion orders material held in memory. Attention 
paid to information at initial exposure may result in better 
learning of the material, thus making its recall more 
extensive.
Emotional mood may act to heighten the salience of 
information congruent with that mood. So exposure to 
mood-consistent information at time of learning, while in 
the mood, may result in better recall of that information.
Postman and Brown (1952) made an early demonstration 
of mood affecting the recognition of information. They 
rigged a task of symbol identification on a tachistoscope 
so that they could control their subjects* success or 
failure at it, while the subjects believed the outcome was 
under their control. The subjects finished the rigged 
identification task and then were directed to watch the 
tachistoscope*s screen for words to be flashed on it.
These words were descriptive either of success or failure.
10
It was found that subjects who had succeeded had a 
lower recognition threshold for words relevant to success! 
while those who failed at the rigged task recognized failure 
related words more easily. If success or failure at a 
psychological task can be accepted as an induction of posi­
tive or negative affect, then Postman and Brown's experiment 
may indicate that individuals attend to information con­
gruent with their mood.
Bower and Monteiro (see note 2) investigated which 
characters in a short story subjects attended to while in an 
induced mood state. They hypnotically induced either 
strong happy or sad feelings in their subjects, then gave 
them a short story to read.
The story contained two main characters: one was
happy and had pleasant things happen to him; the other 
experienced nothing but bad luck and bad feelings. Care 
was taken to make sure the language of the story was not 
more emphatic on one character than another, and that 
equal amounts of story details were devoted to each.
The authors predicted that the subjects would focus 
on the character whose experiences were consistent with 
their own mood. Subjects feeling good would consider the 
positive character to be the story's protagonist. Those 
in a bad mood would think they were reading a story 
centered upon the negative character.
11
The prediction was confirmed when subjects were ques­
tioned after reading, while still in the same mood. Almost 
all of them considered the character congruent with their 
own moods to be the most emphasized in the story, to have 
the most factual details attributed to him, and to be the 
character they identified with. A large majority of the sub 
jects also reported more mental images associated with the 
congruent character, and were able to recall more details 
about him.
It can be concluded from this experiment that infor­
mation about fictional characters is more salient to in­
dividuals when it is consistent with their own mood.
Brown, Gilligan, and Monteiro (1981) questioned the 
certainty of conclusions drawn from the previous experiment. 
The high identification with one of the two characters 
could be as adequate an explanation as a focus on the 
statements in the story consistent with subject mood.
For this reason, a second story was devised. This 
new story had only one real character (others were men­
tioned but not described)• By making this alteration, 
the authors sought to eliminate the competing hypothesis 
of character identification. If the effect were still 
present, it could be confidently concluded that subjects 
were attending to congruent phrases.
12
This proved to be so. Subjects that the authors 
placed (hynotically) in a happy state remembered more posi­
tive facts than sad facts and vice versa for sad subjects.
The Present Experiment
Unfortunately, modification of the short story did 
not preclude further challenges to Bower, et al.'s (1981) 
conclusions. The one upon which the present study is based 
is that purely cognitive awareness by the subject might 
serve as an intensifier of attention.
It seems quite plausible that if a subject is strongly 
holding the idea of a mood in consciousness, that concept 
will suffice to heighten attention to information con­
gruent to nood. For example, perceiving that an experimen­
ter's interest is happiness, the subject may well try to 
focus on what the experiment seems to be about: happiness
and related information. Being in the mood might have 
nothing to do with selective attention, while an awareness 
of the experiment's apparent purpose might.
In order to test this counter-hypothesis, the fol­
lowing experiment was designed to replicate the Bower, 
et al. (1981) study using both mood and suggestions of 
a "cognitive set" as manipulations.
13
Method
Subjects
Sixty-nine undergraduates, enrolled in introductory 
psychology courses participated for partial academic 
credit. Twenty-eight (13 males and 15 females) received 
an emotional mood manipulation, while 30 subjects (13 males 
and 17 females) were given a suggestion of cognitive set. 
Also, eleven males and females served as a control group, 
receiving only a neutral writing task.
Procedure
Subjects were initially brought into a soundproof 
room in groups of three. There, they were given 15 minutes 
for one of three possible writing tasks: the mood manipu­
lation, the cognitive set suggestion, or an essay on 
introductory psychology. They were subsequently told to 
read a short story (the same story used in (Bower, et al., 
1981)) made up of positive, negative, and neutral "idea 
units." Following the story, subjects were asked to 
describe their current emotional state by answering a 
questionnaire. Finally, they were given five minutes 
to recall all they could c* the story they had read earlier.
14
Materials
Writing Tasks. For purposes of altering emotional 
mood subjects wrote about emotional experiences they had 
undergone. There were two types of mood to be induced: 
positive and negative or "Happy" and "Sad." It was ex­
pected that if subjects reflected on and wrote about such 
experiences, they would feel the emotions originally asso­
ciated with them.
Those subjects given a manipulation of cognitive 
set were told to write generally on the topics of happiness 
and sadness. Again, there was an equal subdivision of 
subjects into Happy and Sad categories. [It should be 
emphasized that subjects in this group were not intended 
to experience the moods about which they wrote. Instead, 
the concepts of happiness and sadness were to be made 
more salient to the subject. In short, subjects were to 
be made well aware that the experiment was concerned with 
a particular mood.
A third group was asked to write abstractly about 
the utility of introductory psychology courses. In this 
case, the topic written about was not supposed to induce 
a mood or suggest a cognitive set.
(Copies of the three writing tasks are reproduced 
in Appendices A, B, and C.)
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Short Story. Every subject read a two and one half 
page narrative account of a young man undergoing psycho­
therapy. Its components were 78 "idea units" - propositions 
involving the story's protagonist - that had either a posi­
tive, negative or neutral emotional valence. There were 
equal numbers of each kind of component (26 each).
The story used is identical with the one used by 
Bower et al. (1981). (Copies of the story in its original 
form and divided into >.ypes of "idea units" are reproduced 
in Appendices D and E.)
Mood-Measurement Questionnaire. Subjects reported 
their emotional mood by rating the self-applicability of 
22 adjectives. These were listed on seven-point, monopolar 
scales, and were divided into the following categories:
Happy, Sad, and Angry. [The descriptive adjectives 
labelled Angry were not tabulated in this experiment.
They were included in the questionnaire by virtue of an 
earlier experimental design, that was later dropped.]
Sum totals were established for Sad scales taken to­
gether, and for all the Happy scales.
16
Results
The experimental design provided for two sets of 
measurements. The first is the set of responses each 
subject made to the moou-measurement questionnaire. The 
second is the number of positive and negative items that 
were recalled from the short story.
Mood Questionnaire. Levels of positive and negative 
affect were represented by sums of responses to positive 
and negative scales, respectively.
Table 1 below displays the mean negative scores 
(sums of negative scales for each subgroup in both the 
mood and cognitive manipulations).
Table 1
Mean Levels of Negative Affect
Happy Sad
Mood
Males 12.7 15.8
Females 10.2 10.0
11.4 12.9
Cognitive
Males 9.1 10.0
Females 11.2 10.5
10.1 n r r
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A 2x2x2 analysis of variance performed on negative 
mood scores failed to yield a significant result. (F (1, 50) 
= .856, £ < .359) of particular interest is that Sad 
subjects in the mood condition were not significantly 
sadder than subjects in the Happy group.
In table 2, th€: mean positive scores are displayed 
Similar to the negative scores, they are sums of responses 
to positive scales.
Table 2
Mean Levels of Positive Affect
Happy Sad
Mood
Males 23.6 16.2
Females 18.8 26.0
21.2
Cognitive
21.1
Males 19.5 22.0
Females 19.9 17.5
19.7 T O
A 2x2x2 analysis of variance also failed to produce 
results of significance for positive mood scores. (F (1, 50) 
* 1.37, £ < .247) The most important result here is that
Happy subjects did not report being significantly happier 
than Sad subjects.
A preliminary conclusion may be drawn at this point. 
The writing about personal, emotional experiences was not 
effective in inducing emotional mood. If it had been,
18
there would De demonstrable differences between subjects 
in the Happy and Sad groups in their levels of affect.
Since this is not so, it is reasonable to conclude the 
desired moods were not induced in subjects given the mood 
manipulation.
Recall Data
Recall of short story components was gauged by 
counting the number of positive and negative components 
recalled (out of a possible 26 each).
Shown below in Table 3 are the mean numbers of posi­
tive and negative items recalled for each subgroup in both 
the mood and cognitive set conditions.
Table 3
Mean Numbers of Story Items Recalled
Happy Sad
Mood
(+) (-) (+) (-)Male 33.0 33.2 30.6 47.0
Female 36.6 39.0 36.3 46.5
34.8 36.1
Cognitive
33.5 TT71
(+) (-) ( + ) (-)Male 36.8 38.0 29.5 25.3
Fema le 34,2 39.3 34.3 37.3
T 3 3 7877 TTJS i m
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A 2x2x2x2 analysis of variance did not demonstrate 
a significant difference between groups in recall of the 
story’s components. (F (1, 50) * .181, p < .584)
This result implies that neither type of manipulation 
made any difference in the types of "idea units" subjects 
recalled. While it certainly does not confirm the hypothe­
sis - that mood serves as an effective context for attention 
and learning, and cognitive suggestion serves just as well - 
this result is not a completely obscure one. Possible infer­
ences that stop short of confirming or disconfirming the 
hypothesis are presented in the next section.
20
Discussion
As previously stated, this experiment's hypothesis
was that retention of material congruent with mood at time
of learning could be duplicated using a cognitive suggestion
about mood as a recall context. Were this to have been the
result the notion of mood as the context for selective learn
§ing could have been challenged; the phenomenon could have 
instead been explained as the subject's awareness of the 
experimenter's interest (a certain emotion) and deliberate 
attention to that idea.
Unfortunately, this question goes unanswered. An 
analysis of the data gathered in this experiment fails to 
bring forth a single significant result. One is forced to 
assume that all of the differences found in those analyses 
are due to chance.
One of the most unexpected results of the experiment 
is the apparent failure of the mood manipulation. Subjects 
asked to write about happy experiences did not report being 
happier than those asked to write about sad experiences.
The reverse is also true. Those subjects who wrote sad 
experiences did not report being sadder than those writing 
about happy experiences.
21
This unforseen outcome in turn casts the result of 
the recall analysis in a different light. It most prob­
ably accounts for the failure to replicate Bower, Gilli- 
gan, and Monteiro's (1981) results, where mood proved to 
be a context for attention and selective learning. Because 
the subjects were not successfully placed in the desired 
moods, the Happy and Sad conditions amounted to little 
more than arbitrary labels.
The importance of the mood-measurement failure is 
that it renders the recall results invalid. For instance, 
the fact that subjects in the Happy (mood) group didn*t 
recall more positive facts cannot be construed as discon- 
firming evidence. Rather, it seems to reflect a failure 
to test the effect at all, by reason of a faulty procedure. 
Put simply, a mood does not function as a context for 
selective attention if it is not present in the first 
place. By failing to induce emotional mood in the sub­
jects, mood-congruity of items recalled was not adequately 
tested.
A possible explanation for the ineffective mood 
manipulation is the deviation from Bower, et al.'s (1981) 
procedure. In that experiment, mood was not induced by 
writing about personal experiences, but by hypnotic sug­
gestion. Their subjects were told, once hypnotized, to 
visualize themselves in several standard depressing or
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elating situations. While the hypnotic procedure appeared 
sufficient to alter mood, it was changed to a related but 
nonhypnotic one in anticipation of challenges to the gen­
erality of results. It could be well argued that infer­
ences made from a small population of "highly hypnotizable" 
subjects should not apply to humans in general. In any 
case, it is possible that this change "backfired”? a clear- 
cut result of dubious generality seems to have been exchanged 
for an easily generalizable absence of the effect.
It may also be observed that the group given the cog­
nitive suggestion showed no congruity effect between mood 
suggested to them and type of "idea unit" recalled from 
the short story. This, too, is notable - though for differ­
ent reasons than the absence of an effect for the mood 
condition. T ie failure to observe a relation between mood 
cognitively suggested and type of items recalled may be 
seen as a mild indication - and no more - that the experi­
ment's hypothesis is wrong.
A restatement of that hypothesis is that given 
equivalent procedures, a simple suggestion of a mood as 
the experiment's interest will function as well as the 
actual experience of that mood, as a learning context.
The absence of a congruity effect might be taken 
as evidence that cognitive suggestion is ineffective for 
producing effects similar to mood-consistent ones. But, 
it might as well be taken to mean that a flaw in the
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nearly identical procedures followed (for mood and cognitive 
groups) somehow thwarted observation of all possible con- 
gruity effects. What is needed to render this result 
disconfirmatory is the production of mood-congruity effects 
using a similar procedure. Without a success in the parallel 
condition, this negative cognitive-conqruity result remains 
attributable to faulty procedure, and thus equivocal.
Suggestions for further research are usually obvi­
ous when an experiment fails to be conclusive. Since this 
is apparently due to an ineffective procedure, reiteration 
of the experiment with procedural changes seems in order.
What really needs to be changed here is the mood 
manipulation. Experimental methods do exist for altering 
a subject's mood. Quite apparently, a working method needs 
to be substituted for theone presently used. Also, such a 
method would have to lend itself to the creation of an 
analogous method for the cognitive manipulation. The need 
for an equivalent but non-mood-inducing procedure limits the 
choice of a mood induction.
Another procedural modification might improve the 
potential for replication by attempting to more closely 
duplicate Bower, et al.'s (1981) procedure rather than 
trying to find a more efficient substitute. In the origi­
nal study, there was an interval of 4-6 hours between 
reading the story and recall; in this one, only about 15
24
minutes. Perhaps this variation (in addition to failure 
of the mood induction) is responsible for the absence of 
congruity effects. It might well be that a time interval/ 
with its concomitant addition of material to memory/ makes 
the requirement of a recall context of some kind more pro­
nounced. If this is so, then the 4-6 hour interval is 
necessary to demonstrate the phenomenon, and restoring it 
to the procedure will result in successful replication.
To sum up it is likely that the initial hypothesis 
was inadequately tested because of errors in the experi­
mental design. Recall results show an absence of the 
desired effects, but remain equivocal in view of insufficient 
subject manipulation.
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APPENDIX A 
(Happy)
Lift-Event Inventory
We ere developing e life-event inventory (LEI) to study whet kinds of 
positive end negetive experiences people heve in their lives. For this 
reason, we are trying to collect a variety of life-events and we ask you 
for your help on this task by reporting an event in your recent peat.
It is most important for us t at these reports be as vivid and detailed 
as possible. And therefore we ask you to follow the instructions on the 
next page exactly. Of course, all yoir reports are anonymous and confi­
dential. After completing your description you can enclose it in the 
provided envelope and seal it. This will ensure that it is not possible 
to relate your report to you as an individual. Thanks for your help.
Instructions
PIsaac think about tha last ftv months. What mads you fssl rsally 
good rscsntly? Plsass taks tins to imagine what this svsnt was Ilka 
that mads you rsally fssl good and try to rslivs it again in your mind's 
ays. Than describe what mads you fssl good as vividly and in as much detail 
as you can.
The following questions may help you with this task: What wars you
feeling} What mads you fssl this way? What was Important for you? What 
led up to that feeling? Did that svsnt set off some chain of thoughts or 
fantasies that enhanced your feelings? What were they?
Plsass make your description as vivid and as detailed as you can.
You may use IS minutes for the task.
APPENDIX A
(SAD)
Life-Event Inventory
We ere developing a life-event Inventory (LEI) to study what kinds of 
positive and negative experiences people have in their lives. For this 
reason, we are trying to collect a variety of life-events and we ask you 
for your help on this task by reporting an event in your recent past.
It is most important for us that these reports be as vivid and detailed 
as possible. And therefore we ask you to follow the instructions on the 
next page exactly. Of course, all you: reports are anonymous and confi­
dential. After completing your description you can enclose it In the 
provided envelope and seal it. This will ensure that it is not possible 
to relate your report to you as an individual. Thanks for your help.
Instructions
Please think about the last ftv months. What mads you faal raally 
badly recently? Please take time to Imagine what this event was like 
that made you really feel badly and try to relive it again in your mind's 
aye. Then describe what made you feel badly as vividly and in as much 
detail as you can.
The following questions may help you with this task: What were you
feeling? What made you feel this way? What was important for you? What 
led up to that feeling? Did that event set off some chain of thoughts 
or fantasies that enhanced your feelings? What were they?
Please make your description as vivid aad as detailed as you can.
You may use 15 minutes for the task.
APPENDIX B 
(HAPPY)
Happiness is more than anything else a state of mind, but vc are Interested in 
the real world effects of being in a happy state of mind. Belov please describe 
how you think being happy would affect people*s behavior and experience in each 
of the areas listed. Take as much tine as you need, but mention and explain 
several effects for each of the areas listed.
A. Social Life / (Example, "I would think that happiness might make people
generally more active and interested in involving 
themselves in social activities.**
Behavioral Effect# of Happiness
B. Sports
Behavioral Effects of Happiness (Cont)
C. Academic achlvement
D. Physical health
e. Productivity In the workplace
APPENDIX B
(SAD)
Sadness is more than anything else a state of mind, but we are Interested in 
the real world effects of being in a sad state of mind. Below please describe 
h w  you think being sad would affect people's behavior and experience in each 
of the areas listed. Take as ouch time as you needv but mention and explain 
several effects for each of the areas listed.
A. Social Life / (example, "I would think that sadness might make people
generally more active and interested in involving 
themselves la social activities."
Behavioral Effects of Sadness
B, Sports
Behavioral Effects of Sadness(cont)
C. Academic achievement
D. Physical health
E. Productivity in the workplace
APPENDIX C
Psychology and Everyday Life
We are interested in what you have learned from Psychology 100 that is relevant 
to various aspects of daily life anJ experience. Below please explain what 
you recall from psychology so far that is related to or could be applied to 
people's behavior and experience in the following areas. Tike as ouch tioe as 
you need, but mention and explain what you think is relevant for each of the 
areas listed, thank you.
A. Social Life
1* Sports
Psychology and Everyday Life (Cont)
C. Academic Achievement
D. Physical Health
I. Productivity In the workplace
APPENDIX D
Paul Smith had been seeing a psychiatrist for several cessions now.
They had been making some progress together, but Paul's ambivalence in certain 
areas of his experience still remained prominent. The psychiatrist had sug­
gested hypnotic age regression sessions as a possible therapeutic modality for 
him, so Paul had agreed.
The first trance experience uncovered some interesting childhood experiences 
At the age of A, Paul remembered the happiness of playing with his family at home 
He recalled the glee and fascination when he rode piggy back on his father's 
back, seeing the broad smile glistening on his mother's face, and the joyous 
laugh of his father's voice in the background. He also recalled some sad experi­
ences at this early age. He accessed the overwhelming sadness when his dog was 
run over by a car; his grief at his grandfather's death; and the despair of 
watching a hard-earned quarter slip through the grating of the sewer. He also 
recalled the giggles of his sibling as they lay awake at night telling jokes, 
the happiness of his grandmother's face at his birthday party, and the delight 
and joy present at holiday family gatherings.
In the second age regression he went back to his early years in grammar 
school. He recalled the sadness in being cut from his baseball team, and the 
glumness encountered upon resignedly realizing the inevitability of a return 
visit to the dreaded dentist, lie also remembered the joy and excitement in 
learning to spell his name properly, and the jubilation of receiving the top 
grade in his class. Additionally recalled was the dismal and cheerless memory 
of staying inside on a gloomy, rainy day, and his crestfallen stature upon 
receiving news of his sister's auto accident. The session concluded with a 
termination of the trance, and a brief discussion of the significance of the 
past events to the present situation.
IWith the arrival of the third hypnosis session, the psychiatrist informed 
Paul that he was relatively happy with the hcrapcutic progress. Paul in return 
stated he could feel happy, and that he could also feci sad. An age regression 
trance to adolescent years was then effected. In this trance, Paul recalled 
the happiness which enveloped him when he was blissfully with his first girl­
friend; he also sadly remembered her family moving to another town. He re-exper­
ienced the elation in scoring high on his SAT scores, and the fantastic joy of 
being accepted in college. Other memories included the sadness of departing 
from his high school friend, and his sorrowful attendance at his grandmother's 
funeral. ‘These experiences were interspersed with others that included a jubilfint 
back-packing outing in the mountains, a fun filled beer party with his close 
friends, and a despair-filled evening that resulted from a sorrowful rejection by
0
a steady date. After several hours, the trance session was terminated and he’ 
left with a mixture of feelings.
He arrived somevrhat depressed for the next session, but reported he had been 
generally happy during the week. After brief casual conversation, an age regress­
ion trance was once again utilised. The memory in this session involved Paul's 
early teenage years. He remembered the elation in hearing his first rock and roll 
album and the high he felt in going to his first rock concert. He also recalled 
the despondency experienced in hearing rumors of the breakup of the Beatles, the 
despair of not obtaining tickets to a Rolling Stones concert, and the sadness in 
discovering a warp in a newly purchased double album. Other memories quickly 
flashed through his awareness: the delight of meeting an old friend, the jubilation 
of a last second victory in a football game, and the hilarious performance of a stage 
comedian in a night club. The thoughts contined at a quick but naturqfrate: the flunking
* *
of an important final oxnm; the grief in his host friend's voice when ho 
informed Paul of his rejection by college admissions committees; the 
remorse fulness after losing his allowance; and the overwhelming sorrow in 
hearing his mother had developed cancer. Paul experienced himself as a 
passive but involved observer to these fleeting incidents. However, as the 
session ended, he knew a shift inside of him had occurred. He walked out 
of Che office in dsep internal processer..
When Paul returned to the office several days later, he was in the 
same state as when he left the last session. They discussed the various 
outcomes of the age regression sessions, and decided that the therapeutic 
investigation would continue, but no longer using hypnosis.
1. Afc the age of four, Paul remembered the happiness of ploying with his 
family at home
2. He recalled the glee and fascination
3. when ha rode piggy-back on his father's back,
4. seeing the broad smile glistening on his mother's face,
5* and the Joyous laugh of his father's voice in the background
6. He also recalled the giggles of his siblings
7. as they lay awake at night telling jokes
8. the happiness of his grandmother's face at his birthday party
9. the delight and joy present at holiday family gatherings.
10. He also remembered the joy and excitement
11. when he learned to spell his name properly
12. and the jubilation of receiving the top grade in his class
13. (psychiatrist was) relatively happy with the therapeutic progress
14. Paul in retusn stated he could feel happy
15. In this trance, Paul recalled the happiness which enveloped him
16. • when he blissfully was with his first girlfriend
17. He re-experienced the elation in scoring high on his SAT scores
18. and the fantastic joy o5 being accepted into college
19. (experiences) included a jubilant back-packing outing in the mountains
20. a fun filled beer party with his close friends
21. He reported he had been generally happy during the week.
22. He remembered the elation in hearing his first rock and roll album
23. and the high he felt in going to his first rock concert.
24. (other experiences Included) the delight of meeting an old friend
25. the jublilation of & last second victory in a football game
26. and the hilarious performance of a stage comedian in a night club.
Sad Itens
1. He also recalled some sad experiences at this early age*
2* He accessed the overwhelming sadness
3. when his dog was run over by a car;
4. his grief at his grandfather’s death;
5* and the despair of watching a hard-earned quarter slip thrv.ughtthe 
grating of the sewer.
6. He recalled the sadness in being cut from his baseball team,
7. and the glumness encountered
8. when he resignedly realized the inevitability of a return visit to 
the dreaded dentist.
9. Additionally recalled was the dismal and cheerless memory of staying 
inside on a gloomy, rainy day,
10. and his crestfallen stature upon receiving news of his sister’s auto accident.
11. (he stated) he could also feel sad.
12. he also remembered her family moving to another town.
13. Other memories Included the sadness of departing from his high. acho*?l 
friends,
14. and his sorrowful attendance at his grandmother's funeral.
15. (other experiences included) a despair filled evening
16. that resulted from a sorrowful rejection by a steady date.
17. He arrived somewhat depressed for the nest session.
18. He also recalled the despondency experienced in hearing rumors of the 
breakup of the Beatles.
19. the despair of not obtaining tickets to a Rolling*Stones concert
20. and the sadness in discovering a warp In a newly puchased double album*
2}. the flunking of an Important final exam;
22. the grief in his best friend's voice
23. when he Informed Paul of his rejection by college admissions committee?;
24. the remorsefullnass after losing his allowance;
25. and the overwhelming sorrow he experienced
26. when he heard his mother had developed cancer.
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Neutral Items
1. Paul Smith had been seeing a psychiatrist for several sessions now.
2. They had been making some progress together,
3. but Paul's ambivalence in some areas of his experience still remained 
prominent.
4. The psychiatrist had suggested hypnotic age regression sessions as 
. a possible therapeutic modality for him,
5. so Paul had agreed.
6. The first trance experience uncovered some interesting childhood experiences.
7. In the second age regression he went back to his early years in grammar school
8. The session concluded with a termination of the trance
9. and g t>rlef discussion of the significance of the past events to the 
present situation.
10. With the arrival of the third hypnosis session, the psychiatrist informed 
Paul
11. An age regression trance to adolescent years was then effected.
12. These experiences were Interspersed with others
13. After several hours, the trance session was terminated
14. and Paul left with a mixture of feelings.
15. After brief casual conversation, an age regression trance was again utilized. 
16..The memories in the session Involved Paul's early teenage years.
17. Other memories quickly flashed through his awareness
18. ©he thoughts continued at a quick but natural rate:
19. Paul experienced himself as a passive but involved observer to these fleeting 
incidents.
20. However, as the session ended, he knew a shift inside of him had occurred.
21. He walked out of the office in deep internal processes.
22. When Paul returned to the office several days later,
23. he was in the same state as when he left the last session
%
24. They discussed the various outcomes of the age regression sessions,
25. and decided that tho therapeutic investigations would continue,
26. but no longer using hypnosis.
APPENDIX F
Momentary Self-description Scale
This scale consists of words or phrases to describe yourself. Please 
describe how you are feeling at the present time.
Record your answers on this sheet by circling the appropriate number. 
Presented below is the scale for indicating the degree to which each word 
describes the way you feel.
... - I - ............. l____________ 3______________ i_____________ s
very slightly slightly moderately considerably very 
or not at all strongly
relevant
Remember, you are requested to make your responses on the basis of the way 
you feel at this time. Work at a good pace. It is not neceseary to ponder; the 
first answer you decide on for a given word is probably the most valid.
1. enraged i 2 3 4 5 12. displeased i 2 3 4 3
2. joyful i 2 3 4 3 13. contented i 2 3 4 3
3. elated i 2 3 4 5 14. rejected i 2 3 4 3
4. happy i 2 3 4 5 13. downhearted 1 2 3 4 5
5. fearful i 2 3 4 5 16. delighted 1 2 3 4 3
6. angry i 2 3 4 3 17. discontented! 2 3 4 3
7. sad i 2 3 4 5 18. proud 1 2 3 4 3
8. pleased i 2 3 4 5 19. sorrowful 1 2 3 4 5
9. disgusted i 2 3 4 5 20. blue 1 2 3 4 3
10. depressed i 2 3 4 5 21. fine 1 2 3 4 3
11. mad i 2 3 4 5 22. gloomy 1 2 3 4 3
